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ABSTRACT
How should the issue of domestic labor standards be handled in the GATT/WTO?  This question is
part of a broader debate over the appropriate scope of international economic institutions such as the
GATT (and now its successor, the WTO), where member-countries are considering proposals for a
new round of negotiations that would move beyond GATT’s existing focus on trade barriers and
cover "domestic" issues such as labor and environmental standards and regulatory reform which have
traditionally been treated with “benign neglect” within GATT.  Such proposals encroach on
traditional limits of national sovereignty, and they raise fundamental challenges to the existing
structure of international economic relations among sovereign states.  In this paper we consider
several approaches to the treatment of domestic labor standards within a trade agreement.  We use
simple economic arguments to show that, while the benign neglect of labor standards within a trade
agreement will result in inefficient choices for both trade barriers and labor standards, direct
negotiations over labor standards are not required to reach efficient outcomes.  Specifically, we
describe two tariff negotiating structures that deliver efficient outcomes while preserving varying
degrees of national sovereignty over policy choices.  A first approach combines tariff negotiations
with subsequent Kemp-Wan adjustments, under which each government is free to alter unilaterally
its policy mix so long as trade volumes are not affected. A second approach adds to the first approach
GATT’s rule of reciprocity, under which subsequent to tariff negotiations each government is free
to alter unilaterally its tariff, but its trading partner is then free to reciprocate with a tariff response
that stabilizes export prices.   We show that both approaches will deliver governments to the
efficiency frontier, but that the second approach provides governments with greater sovereignty over
their policy choices and bears a strong resemblance to the negotiating procedures spelled out in
GATT.
JEL Nos.: F02, F13, F15. 
*Bagwell: Columbia University, Staiger: The University of Wisconsin at Madison and NBER.  This
paper was written for the Conference on Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy, Washington, D.C.,
April 16-17, 1998.  We thank our discussants, John Jackson and TN Srinivasan, for very helpful
comments.  We have also benefitted from very useful discussions with conference participants.1See Dam (1970) and Jackson (1969, 1989) for authoritative accounts of GATT principles and practices. 
For a very useful discussion of the way labor standards are currently handled in the WTO, see Enders (1996). 
1
I.  Introduction
How should the issue of domestic labor standards be handled in the GATT/WTO?  This
question is part of a broader debate over the appropriate scope of international economic institutions
such as the GATT (and now its successor, the WTO), where member-countries are considering
proposals for a new round of negotiations that would move beyond GATT’s existing focus on trade
barriers and cover traditionally "domestic" issues such as labor and environmental standards and
regulatory reform.  Such proposals encroach on traditional limits of national sovereignty, and they
raise fundamental challenges to the existing structure of international economic relations among
sovereign states.  In this paper we explore some of the linkages between trade policy and labor policy,
and we consider several approaches to the treatment of domestic labor standards within a trade
agreement.
As currently structured, GATT’s approach to labor standards might be most aptly
characterized as one of “benign neglect.”
1  This characterization reflects two dimensions, the first of
which is simply the degree to which GATT members are obligated to uphold a set of minimum
standards for labor policies.  While there is an explicit provision within GATT articles that allows
governments to restrict importation of the products of prison labor, the determination of domestic
labor standards is for the most part considered the legitimate domain of each national government,
and weak labor standards do not constitute a violation of GATT obligations.  Rather, as Enders
(1996, p. 62) observes, “...the WTO rules place no constraints on a country’s right...to regulate [its]
labour practices...”  This then implies a second dimension to GATT’s approach to labor standards,
which is essentially that the obligations on trade restrictions (e.g., tariff bindings) that a GATT
member does accept can not lawfully and unilaterally be later modified or withdrawn in order to
respond to the labor standards of a trading partner, either for the purpose of influencing the labor
standards of the trading partner or to offset the cost advantages associated with those standards on2This is not to say that GATT members have no ability to respond to the labor standard choices of their
trading partners.  As Enders (1996, pp. 64-65) observes, if the tariff in question is not bound in a GATT schedule,
then a country is of course free to raise the tariff for this (or any other) reason, and even where the tariff in question
is covered by a GATT binding the country could still raise the tariff through an Article XXVIII modification,
though it would then be obligated to make “compensatory adjustments” under which it lowered other tariffs or else
face a “reciprocal” tariff increase from its trading partner.  Moreover, in principle, a claim of “nullification and
impairment” associated with a trading partner’s labor policies might successfully be brought under GATT’s
dispute settlement procedures if it could be shown that these labor policies interfered with market access in a way
that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of the tariff negotiations.  In practice, however, the
burden of proof and other features of so-called “non-violation” complaints under GATT’s dispute settlement
procedures make them difficult to carry out, and from 1947 through 1995 only 14 out of the more than 250 GATT
dispute proceedings centered on such complaints  (see, for example, Petersmann, 1997, pp. 135-176).      
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a particular product.
2  Hence, for the most part, current GATT rules respect the sovereignty of
domestic decisions over labor standards, as they allow each member government to determine its own
labor policies without worrying about the ramifications of these choices for either its GATT
obligations or those of its trading partners.
It is the wisdom of preserving this national sovereignty over domestic labor policies while at
the same time negotiating successive multilateral agreements to liberalize world trade which is now
being challenged from various quarters in the United States and elsewhere in the industrialized world.
The primary concern voiced by labor interests and social activists is that working conditions and
wages in industrialized countries will suffer from trade liberalization as a result of increased import
competition from countries where labor standards are weak or not enforced.  It is feared that such
pressures could fuel a “race to the bottom,” in which the labor standards of the industrialized world
are compromised in the name of international “competitiveness.”  These concerns have in turn led to
proposals to introduce the issue of labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda of the WTO,
with the purpose of creating a “social clause” for the WTO that would permit restrictions to be placed
on imports from countries not complying with a specified list of minimum standards (see, for example,
the description of these proposals in Maskus, 1997, pp. 58-62).  These proposed changes would
allow governments to raise import restrictions in response to the weak labor standards of their trading
partners, and if adopted these changes would mark a dramatic departure from the “benign neglect”
approach to labor standards that has been followed by GATT over its 50 year history.  With the WTO
facing proposals for such fundamental changes in its approach to the issue of domestic labor3For example, Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1996) focus on the welfare and terms-of-trade effects of the
imposition of labor standards in the presence of free trade but do not consider the choice of tariff policy, while
Srinivasan (1996) considers whether diversity of labor standards alters the case for free trade but is not concerned
with whether trade liberalization might alter a country’s choice of labor standards.
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standards, it is a good time to consider the question: How should the issue of domestic labor
standards be handled in the GATT/WTO? 
Much has been written on the interaction between international trade and labor standards (see,
for example, Brown, Deardorff and Stern, 1996, Srinivasan, 1996, and the papers dealing with this
issue from a legal perspective in the authoritative volumes edited by Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996, as
well as the very useful discussion of the issues and literature contained in Brown, Deardorff and
Stern, 1997), and no single paper can do justice to the broad set of issues that are involved.
However, an important dimension that is absent from this literature is a formal economic analysis of
the interaction between negotiations over trade policy and the determination of labor standards.
3  Yet
it is within the context of sustained negotiations to liberalize world trade that the need to negotiate
international agreements over labor standards has been most forcefully raised, and it is from the
backdrop of GATT’s successes in securing low levels of negotiated tariffs on a multilateral basis that
the case for adding labor standards to the negotiating agenda of the WTO must be evaluated.  Hence,
an understanding of the interaction between tariff negotiations and the determination of labor policies
seems a necessary starting point for assessing the claim that labor standards will suffer as a result of
trade liberalization and for considering how the issue of labor standards ought to be approached by
the WTO.  
In this paper we evaluate the relative merits of several approaches to the treatment of
domestic labor standards within a trade agreement, ranging from one extreme that reflects GATT’s
current approach of benign neglect all the way to the other extreme of direct negotiations over labor
standards to create a social clause for the WTO.  Our broader intent in this research is to provide an
answer to the question we posed at the outset of this paper.  Here we narrow our focus to a more
modest goal: we present a simple economic model within which some of the central features of the
interaction between trade policy and labor standards may be understood, and we use this analytical4
structure to draw attention to an observation that has to our knowledge not appeared previously in
the literature and that seems to us to be worthy of further discussion.  In particular, we show that,
while the benign neglect of labor standards within a trade agreement will result in inefficient choices
of both trade barriers and labor standards, direct negotiations over labor standards are not required
to reach efficient outcomes.  Rather, as we demonstrate below, more modest changes to existing
GATT rules could in principle correct the problems associated with GATT’s current approach to
labor standards without the need to engage in direct negotiations over these domestic policies.   
The basic insight that underlies our findings is quite simple, and can be seen intuitively by
considering the following situation.  Imagine two college students who live in separate dorm-rooms
across a shared courtyard.  Both own stereos but each has a distinct taste in music, and each likes to
listen to his own music both in his room and when walking in the courtyard.  The courtyard is
sufficiently large that neither student’s stereo can be heard inside the other student’s room, but both
stereos can potentially be heard in the courtyard.  All else equal, each student would prefer that his
music dominate that of his neighbor over as much of the courtyard as possible.  The louder is one of
the stereos turned up relative to the other, the further out into the courtyard it will dominate the
other.  Hence, each student is aware that by turning up his stereo he can restrict the audible range of
his neighbor’s music in the courtyard as he simultaneously extends the audible range of his own. 
In this setting, consider what problems will arise when the two students set their stereo levels
non-cooperatively, and consider as well what kinds of cooperative agreements might be entertained.
Without some kind of cooperation, both students will turn up their stereos in a competition to
dominate the courtyard, and each student will therefore play his stereo at a level which is louder
inside his room than he would choose in the absence of the courtyard competition.  An obvious
solution to this inefficient situation is for the two students to agree to turn down their stereos to
mutually acceptable levels, perhaps preserving the relative balance in the courtyard but achieving
desired reductions in the sound level inside each room.  However, an agreement that simply specified
the setting of the volume knob for each stereo would now tempt each student to achieve dominance
in the courtyard by less direct means, perhaps for example by reorienting his speakers increasingly4In Bagwell and Staiger (1996, 1997, forthcoming) we establish that this is the essential inefficiency that
underlies the possible gains from a trade agreement in a broad class of settings that include both economic and
political motives for member-governments.  
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in the direction of the courtyard window.  Of course, the distortions to in-room listening associated
with manipulating speaker locations would create new inefficiencies, and these new inefficiencies
could also be handled in the same way as the volume settings, by broadening the agreement to cover
both the setting of the volume knob and the placement of the speakers in each room.  And in principle
this broadening could go on until the negotiations covered every conceivable angle that either student
might test in his effort to achieve dominance in the courtyard. 
But an alternative approach to negotiations is also possible once the essential features of the
problem are understood.  Since each student is driven to make inefficient choices regarding his stereo
operation by the incentive to affect the courtyard volume of his music relative to that of his neighbor,
each student could in principle retain the right to unilaterally determine the details of his stereo
operation without sacrificing efficiency provided that he faced appropriate restrictions under the
agreement that offset this incentive.  For instance, an agreement could simply specify courtyard
volume levels for each stereo directly, and then let each student decide on how best to satisfy the
terms of the agreement (e.g., what combination of volume-knob setting and speaker placement
consistent with the agreed-upon courtyard volume would provide him with the best in-room
listening).               
As it turns out, the analogy between the situation described above and that faced by trade
negotiators is surprisingly close in its essentials.  In the absence of any form of international (inter-
room) agreement, governments (students) will tend to raise tariffs (volume knob settings) to
inefficiently high levels in an effort to restrict the market access of foreign products (drown-out
competing stereos) and enjoy the lower foreign exporter prices (reduced audible range of competing
music) that result.  This is the fundamental inefficiency that a trade agreement such as GATT can
correct.
4  However, if an agreement is negotiated that covers only direct restrictions on trade such
as tariffs, the unilateral urge to limit market access will be deflected on to “domestic” policies such6
as labor standards, whose determination will then be distorted as a consequence of negotiated trade
liberalization.  While introducing labor standards directly onto the negotiating agenda could in
principle eliminate these new distortions, it is not necessary to do so: once the source of the unilateral
incentive to distort labor standards is understood to be derived from the incentive to limit market
access, governments can retain the right to unilaterally determine their own labor standards without
sacrificing efficiency provided that they face appropriate restrictions on their choices which offset
these incentives.  As we establish below, the restrictions that work in principle are closely related to
those embodied in current GATT practice, suggesting that more modest changes to existing GATT
rules might provide an alternative to the direct negotiation of a social clause.
Throughout the paper we attempt to keep technical material to a minimum, so that the ideas
may be highlighted as clearly as possible.  We rely primarily on a series of graphs to express our
results.  A more general mathematical treatment of these and other issues relating to standards and
trade policy may be found in Bagwell and Staiger (1998).  But it is nevertheless important to bear in
mind that our formal analysis abstracts from many of the difficult issues associated with the
determination of national labor standards in an international setting.  For this reason, we do not
interpret our results as implying that bringing labor standards into the WTO is a good idea.  To come
to such a view, many other complications that we have ignored would have to be considered.  Rather,
we interpret our results as implying that, if the WTO is going to act to address this issue of labor
standards, then there are more modest changes to existing GATT rules that ought to be considered
as an alternative to a WTO social clause.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents the benchmark case of
the choice of labor standards in a closed economy.  In section III we then open this economy to trade
and consider how import-competition alters the determination of its labor standards.  In section IV
we introduce tariffs as a second policy variable, so that we may consider how trade policy and labor
standards can interact.  Here we establish that international negotiations over tariffs alone will lead
to a globally inefficient outcome described by partial tariff liberalization and a weakening of labor
standards.  In section V we take up the issue of how GATT negotiations can be structured to7
strengthen labor standards and achieve efficient outcomes.  Finally, section VI concludes.  
II.  Labor Standards in a Closed Economy 
In this section we present the benchmark case of  the choice of labor standards in a closed
economy.  We choose our set of modeling assumptions to reflect some basic features of the issues
described above that we wish to capture.  Whenever there is a choice between generality and clarity
we opt for the latter.  Hence, rather than making a claim on generality, our model should be seen as
simply serving to illustrate some basic points that should be kept in mind in the broader debate over
the appropriate handling of labor standards within GATT.  As we will be particularly interested in
examining how import competition affects the choice of labor standards, we will consider an
“industrialized” economy that determines its labor standard in an industry that may face import
competition from a “less-industrialized” economy abroad.  We first consider the issues involved in
determining the labor standard for this industry when it does not face import competition (i.e. in a
closed economy), and then in the next section turn to a trading environment. 
We focus on a single good x which, with   denoting its price, will be consumed by this px
economy at the rate    and produced at the rate  .  The parameter  Cx(px)’1&px Qx(px,s)’(1&s)%px s
lies between zero and one and denotes the economy’s labor standard, with   corresponding to s’0
a “loose” labor standard and   corresponding to a “tight” labor standard.  Consider, for example, s’1
the possibility that   denotes the stringency of child labor laws.  If children of any age could be s
legally employed in the production of x in this economy, then we would represent this by setting  , s’0
and the economy’s supply of x would be given by  .  At the other extreme, if children were Qx’1%px
strictly prohibited from working in the x industry, then we would represent this by setting  , and s’1
the economy’s supply of x would then be “shifted in” and given by  .  More generally, the labor Qx’px
standard may be set at some intermediate level, in which case the parameter   would be greater than s
zero but less than one, and the economy’s supply of x would lie somewhere in between the two
extremes just described.  5In fact, the economic surplus associated with industry x in a closed-economy setting takes the very simple
algebraic form of  .   (2&s 2)/4
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The top panel of Figure 1 illustrates the market for x in this closed economy, with x-demand
given by the downward-sloping line, and with x-supply given by the upward sloping line intersecting
the x-axis at the value  .  The “autarky” (closed economy) equilibrium price of good x will (1&s)
equate the country’s supply and demand, and is labeled in the top panel of Figure 1 by  .  Notice p
A
x
that a more stringent labor standard (a higher  ) will result in a leftward shift of supply and therefore s
an increase in  .  This simply reflects the fact that more stringent labor standards will reduce the p
A
x
supply of workers available to the industry, and the market-clearing price will rise as a consequence.
Our partial equilibrium focus allows economic surplus associated with industry x in this closed
economy to be measured as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus.  In the equilibrium
depicted in the top panel of Figure 1, consumer surplus is given by the area under the demand curve
and above the market-clearing price  , while producer surplus is given by the area above the supply p
A
x
curve (and the x-axis) and below  .   p
A
x
It can be seen by inspection of the top panel of Figure 1 that the economic surplus in industry
x will be smallest when  , so that the labor standard is at its most stringent: when   the supply s’1 s’1
curve intersects the x-axis at the origin, and so the market-clearing price is one-half and the economic
surplus is one-quarter, as measured by the sum of the areas of the consumer and producer surplus
triangles, each with height one-half and base one-half.  On the other hand, economic surplus in
industry x achieves its maximum value when  , so that the labor standard is at its most lax: when  s’0 s’0
the supply curve intersects the x-axis at one, and so the market-clearing price is zero and the
economic surplus is one-half, as measured by the area of the consumer surplus triangle, with height
one and base one.
5  These observations reflect our implicit assumption that workers excluded from
industry x as a result of tightening labor standards (a rise in  ) can not work elsewhere in the s
economy, and therefore contribute nothing to economic surplus in an alternative use.  Hence, from
the point of view of economic surplus, labor standards in this simple setting have only economic costs
and no economic benefits.  6The parameter   is taken to be a positive constant.  Provided that  , the chosen labor standard will 8 8<1/4
lie strictly between zero and one. 





Of course, even if it is costly from an economic standpoint, a society may still decide to
exclude certain segments of the population (e.g., children) from the workforce for “non-economic”
social reasons, and we assume that the government of this economy does place value on more
stringent labor standards for social reasons.  In particular, we assume that the government values
increases in   at the rate  .
6  Hence, in determining the stringency of the labor standard to apply to s 8
industry x, the government faces a tradeoff between lower economic surplus (as measured in the top
panel of Figure 1) and greater social surplus (as measured by its valuation parameter  ).   8
In the bottom panel of Figure 1, we depict this tradeoff by displaying separately the levels of
economic and social surplus achieved  in this closed economy as a function of the choice of labor
standard  .  The level of economic surplus is given by the dashed curve in the bottom panel of Figure s
1.  This curve plots as a function of   the economic surplus determined in the top panel of Figure 1, s
and it is decreasing monotonically as   increases from zero to one.  The level of social surplus is s
given in the bottom panel of Figure 1 by the straight line out of the origin with slope  .  The sum of 8
economic and social surplus in this closed economy for any choice of  , which we denote by  , s W
A
x (s)
is then depicted by the bold curve in the bottom panel of Figure 1.
7  Henceforth we will refer to
 as the domestic surplus associated with a given labor standard  .    W
A
x (s) s
We assume that the government chooses its labor standard   in autarky to maximize domestic s
surplus  , and therefore it chooses the value of   associated with the highest point on the bold W
A
x (s) s
curve in the bottom panel of Figure 1.  It is straightforward to show that setting the labor standard
at a value of   achieves this maximum, and so the government’s chosen labor standard in autarky 28
will be given by  .  This solution reflects an optimal balance between the attainment of social s A/28
goals and the economic costs of achieving those goals in a closed economy. 8It might be objected at this point that we are “throwing the baby out with the bath water.”  After all, it is
the allegation of weak labor standards in less-industrialized countries that gives rise to the fear that free trade with
these countries will weaken the labor standards of industrialized countries as well.  However, notice that the
channel through which such pressures must be exerted is trade, regardless of the reasons for that trade.  Our
approach here is therefore to abstract from the reasons for trade (which could include weak labor standards in the
exporting country) and focus on the implications of that trade for labor standards in the import-competing country.  
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III.  How Import-Competition Alters the Determination of Labor Standards
Suppose now that the domestic country has an opportunity to trade with a foreign country,
and suppose that the forces of comparative advantage would dictate that the foreign country export
good x to the domestic market.  In the face of import-competition, how will the domestic
government’s choice of labor standards be altered?  This is the question we now seek to answer.
 We consider first how the advent of trade alters the economic surplus associated with
industry x when the domestic labor standard is fixed at the level chosen in autarky,  .  We suppose s A









x in the foreign country.  For simplicity, we abstract from the issue of foreign labor standards, and
assume simply that foreign supply of good x is given by  .







The top panel of Figure 2 depicts the free trade equilibrium between the domestic and foreign
country when the domestic labor standard is fixed at  .  The figure on the left depicts the demands s A
and supplies of the home country as a function of the prevailing home-country price of good x.  The
figure on the right depicts the demands and supplies in the foreign market as a function of the price
of good x prevailing there.  Free trade will ensure that a single price of x prevails in the two markets,
so that  , and this common price will be determined in equilibrium so that the difference px’p
(
x
between demand and supply of good x in the home country (the domestic import demand,
) is equal to the difference between supply and demand of good x in the Mx(px,s A)/Cx(px)&Qx(px,s A)













price is labeled   in the top panel of Figure 2, and this price will prevail in each market (i.e., p
F
x





Notice that at the free trade equilibrium price   depicted in the top panel of Figure 2, the p
F
x
domestic country enjoys increased economic surplus associated with industry x relative to the
economic surplus associated with this industry in autarky (i.e., at  , where the domestic demand p
A
x
and supply curves intersect).  The increase in surplus for the domestic country amounts to the area
above   and below both the domestic demand and supply curves, and in the top panel of Figure 2 p
F
x
we label this additional surplus  .  Given the labor standard  ,   simply measures the G
F
x (s




additional economic surplus that the domestic country achieves through free trade with its foreign
trading partner, or the domestic country’s gains from trade.  Likewise, the gains from trade for the
foreign country are given in the top panel of Figure 2 by the area below   and above both the p
F
x




The gains from trade for the domestic country can be measured equivalently as the area above
the equilibrium price and below the domestic country’s import demand curve  . Mx(px,s A)
Analogously, the gains from trade for the foreign country can be measured equivalently as the area





bottom panel of Figure 2, the domestic import demand and foreign export supply curves are depicted,
with the equilibrium free trade price and trade volume determined by their intersection (with the latter









respectively.  The top and bottom panels of Figure 2 are simply equivalent ways of depicting free
trade equilibrium and the gains from trade. 
Notice in the bottom panel of Figure 2 that the domestic import demand curve intersects the
x-axis at a value equal to the choice of domestic labor standard, and that the gains from trade are
therefore affected by the choice of domestic labor standard.   In particular, as can be seen from
inspection of the bottom panel of Figure 2, each country’s gains from trade would be larger if the
domestic government would tighten its labor standard beyond  , as this would shift out the s A







beyond those depicted in the figure.
9  The linkage between domestic labor standards and the gains
from trade simply reflects the fact that, as the domestic labor standard is tightened, the two countries
become increasingly “different,” and they are able to exploit these differences as the basis for trade.
This suggests that, when faced with the prospect of international trade, the domestic government may
wish to take account of the impact of its labor standard on the gains from trade as it determines its
preferred level for this standard.
To highlight the impact that international trade has on the domestic government’s choice of
labor standard, we therefore decompose the economic and social surplus it achieves with any choice
of   under free trade, which we denote by  , into the sum of (i) the domestic surplus its labor s W
F
x (s)
standard choice would generate in autarky,  , and (ii) the domestic gains from trade associated W
A
x (s)
with this choice,  .  That is, we write the level of free-trade economic and social surplus G
F
x (s)







This decomposition is depicted in Figure 3, the top panel of which depicts the economic and
social surplus associated with free trade when the domestic labor standard is set at the level
determined in autarky,  .  The domestic surplus,  , is plotted (in an inverted fashion) below s A W
A
x (s)
the x-axis as a function of  .  As was shown in Figure 1,  reaches its maximum when  , s W
A
x (s) s’s A
and this is reflected as well in the top panel of Figure 3, where it can be seen that a small movement






Above the x-axis domestic import demand and foreign export supply are plotted.  As observed
previously, the domestic import demand curve intersects the x-axis at a value equal to the domestic
labor standard  , and with the domestic labor standard set at the level determined in autarky this s




Therefore, the surplus achieved by the domestic government under the labor standard   in the s A

















An important implication of international trade for the choice of labor standards can now be
seen.  As reflected in the top panel of Figure 3, when faced with import competition from abroad,
the domestic government can always improve upon   with a small strengthening of its labor s A
standard (a slightly higher  ).  This is because a slight strengthening of domestic labor standards s
from   will have no impact on domestic surplus  , but it will increase the domestic gains from s A W
A
x (s)
trade  .  In effect, while   reflects the optimal balance between the social benefits of more G
F
x (s) s A
stringent labor standards and the economic costs of achieving them in a closed economy (i.e.,  s A
maximizes  ), the opportunity to import from abroad reduces the domestic country’s economic W
A
x (s)
costs of achieving more stringent labor standards, and makes the choice of  tighter labor standards
( ) desirable for the domestic government as a result.   s>s A
The bottom panel of Figure 3 depicts the end result of this process, where the domestic
government has set its labor standard at a level that balances the domestic social benefits of tight labor
standards against the domestic economic costs of achieving these goals in an open economy.  As
depicted, the optimal labor standard level is higher than   and given by  , and at this s A s’88/3/s F
standard level the additional gains from trade for the domestic country that would be generated by
a further tightening of domestic labor standards (the increase in   associated with a small G
F
x (s)
increase in   above  ) would just be matched by the reduction in domestic surplus ( ) that s s F W
A
x (s)
the change in labor standards would generate.  
Hence we have:
Observation 1: Import competition is not an “enemy” of strict labor standards.  Countries will
adopt more stringent labor standards in the presence of import competition
than they would choose to adopt in its absence. 
While we have focused on the impact of import competition on labor standards, similar10A formal confirmation of this can be found in the model detailed in the Appendix to the Comment by
our discussant, TN Srinivasan.   
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arguments can be used to show that just the opposite forces are at work in export sectors.
10  Hence,
more generally trade will induce governments to reorient their labor standards toward greater
stringency in import-competing industries and greater laxity in export sectors.  But the essential point
remains, namely, that there is nothing about exposure to international trade per se that leads
inexorably to weaker labor standards.
IV.  How Trade Liberalization can Weaken Labor Standards
Thus far we have concerned ourselves with the way that trade and labor standards can
interact, assuming that trade remains free of impediments when it occurs.  We now introduce the
possibility that import tariffs may be imposed, and consider how trade policy and labor standards can
interact.  To do this, we proceed in three steps.  Our first step is to determine the import tariff and
labor standard choices that would be optimal for the domestic government in the absence of any
possibility of international policy cooperation  with its foreign trading partner.  Our second step is to
identify inefficiencies associated with these unilateral policy choices, so that the possibility of creating
mutual increases in welfare (by eliminating these inefficiencies) can be established and the basis for
a cooperative international agreement over trade and labor policies may be understood.  Our third
and final step in this section is then to consider whether all the potential benefits from international
cooperation can be achieved with an agreement over trade policy alone.  
As we showed in the previous section, the opportunity to import from abroad reduces the
domestic country’s economic costs of achieving more stringent labor standards, and makes the choice
of tighter labor standards desirable for the domestic government as a result.  When the domestic
government also has an import tariff at its disposal, it has an enhanced ability to “shift the costs” of
its more stringent labor standards onto its trading partner through import protection, and this leads
it to favor more stringent labor standards than it would choose under free trade.  Hence, as we now11In the presence of a domestic import tariff  , the domestic gains from trade function can be written J











show, the ability to impose import protection goes hand-in-hand with tighter labor standards.  
To see this, consider the domestic country’s gains from trade in industry x when its labor
standard is set at the level which would be chosen under free trade,  , but when it sets an ad s F
valorem import tariff   on imports of x from the foreign country.  Letting  , the domestic t J/(1%t)
country’s tariff will drive a wedge between the domestic and foreign price of x, and provided the tariff
is not set so high as to prohibit imports altogether, the resulting trade volume will ensure that
.  This tariff wedge will alter the gains from trade achieved by each country under the px’Jp
(
x
domestic labor standard   from the gains each would have received under free trade, and this in turn s F
will upset the tradeoff between domestic surplus and the gains from trade which, under free trade,
led the domestic government to choose the labor standard  .  Consequently, import protection will s F
render   sub-optimal, and a link between import protection and labor standards can be established. s F
  








domestic import tariff  .
11  Domestic surplus is plotted below the x-axis as a function of the domestic J
labor standard   and, as depicted, the labor standard level   is determined so as to balance the s s F
reduction in domestic surplus that a further tightening of the standard would generate against the
additional domestic gains from free trade that would be created.  With the introduction of a domestic
import tariff  , the domestic government increases the price of x prevailing in its own market while J
it decreases the price of x prevailing in the foreign market relative to the (common) free trade price





Figure 4, the equilibrium domestic and foreign prices associated with the domestic import tariff   are J
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tariff revenue collected by the domestic government).  The foreign country’s gains from trade






the triangle labeled   corresponds to the dead weight loss associated with the import tariff  , as this D J
amount of free trade surplus is lost in the presence of the tariff. 
  
It can now be seen from the top panel of Figure 4 that the additional domestic gains from
trade generated by a slight tightening of the domestic labor standard beyond  will be higher when s F
the domestic government can impose an import tariff than when it is restricted to a policy of free
trade.
12  To see this, consider a small increase in   starting from  , and suppose that the domestic s s F
government were to adjust the level of its import tariff    to keep the dead weight loss associated J
with its tariff policy (  in the figure) unchanged.  Such a tariff adjustment would certainly be feasible D
for the domestic government (and if it is not optimal then the domestic government could only
increase its gains from trade further by adjusting its tariff to the optimal level).  With this tariff
adjustment holding   fixed, the increase in the total (i.e., domestic plus foreign) gains from trade D
generated by the rise in   will be the same as the increase in the total gains from free trade when  s s
rises.  But the domestic country’s share of this increase will be larger than it would be under free
trade, owing to the low foreign price   received by foreign exporters (and the tariff revenue p
T(
x
collected from foreign exporters by the domestic government as a consequence).  Therefore, with an
import tariff at its disposal, the domestic government can generate larger increases in its gains from
trade as it strengthens its labor standard than it would enjoy under free trade.  This implies in turn that
import protection will render   sub-optimal, and that the domestic government will wish to s F
strengthen its labor standard when it can also impose import protection.  
The bottom panel of Figure 4 depicts the domestic government’s choice of labor standard and
import tariff.  For any choice of labor standard, the import tariff will be set to maximize the domestic
gains from trade, and it is straightforward to show that setting   achieves this goal.  The J’2/JN17
domestic labor standard is then set where a further tightening would generate losses in domestic






point is reached by strengthening the domestic labor standard beyond   to  , at which point s F s’38/s N
the domestic government has set its labor standard at a level that balances the domestic social benefits
of tight labor standards against the domestic economic costs of achieving these goals in an open (but
protected) economy. 
Having established that the ability to impose import protection leads the domestic government
to choose tighter labor standards, we now proceed to our second step and characterize the labor
standard and trade policy choices that would be efficient from a world-wide perspective.  We assume
that the two countries have a means of redistributing income between them in a lump sum fashion,
as this allows us to focus on the policy choices that would maximize their joint surplus.  As is well-
understood,  efficiency can not be achieved in this environment in the presence of import tariffs, and
so efficiency will require that the domestic import tariff be set to zero ( ) so that free trade can J’1
prevail.  The remaining question concerns the efficient choice of domestic labor standard  .  We now s
show that a further strengthening of domestic labor standards is required for efficiency.
Figure 5 demonstrates why this must be so.  The top panel of Figure 5 recreates the
determinants of the domestic government’s choice of labor standards under free trade,  .  Recall s F
that this choice balances the reduction in domestic surplus that a further tightening of labor standards
would cause against the generation of additional domestic gains from trade  .  But to achieve G
F
x (s)
an efficient labor standard, the impact of this standard on foreign gains from trade   must be G
F(
x (s)
taken into account as well, and foreign gains from trade also increase with a strengthening of
domestic labor standards.  Hence, domestic labor standards impart a positive externality on foreign
welfare, and efficiency requires that this externality be internalized with more stringent domestic labor
standards than would be chosen by the domestic government on its own.  The bottom panel of Figure
5 depicts the determination of the efficient domestic labor standard.  When this standard is increased
to  , a further rise in   would lead to a reduction in domestic surplus which is just offset by s’48/s E s
the increase in domestic and foreign gains from trade.  As depicted in the figure, the efficient labor18
standard ( ) is more stringent than that which the domestic government would choose in the s E
absence of any international cooperation ( ), and so an international agreement that achieves s N
efficiency must call for free trade and tighter labor standards.  
This brings us to the third and final step in considering how trade policy and labor standards
can interact.  We now wish to determine whether all the potential benefits from international
cooperation can be achieved with an agreement on trade policy alone.  That is, we suppose initially
that tariff and labor policies are set non-cooperatively and that then the domestic and foreign
governments are given the opportunity to negotiate a tariff agreement, but that domestic labor policy
will continue to be set unilaterally by the domestic government.  As before, with international lump
sum transfers available, the two governments will negotiate a tariff agreement that maximizes their
joint surplus, but they must now take into account the fact that domestic labor policy will be set
unilaterally by the domestic government in light of their tariff agreement.  The question we now
consider is whether the inability to negotiate an agreement on labor standards will alter the content
of the tariff agreement or the surplus achieved through negotiation.  As we now establish,
international negotiations over tariffs alone will lead to a globally inefficient outcome described by
partial tariff liberalization and a weakening of labor standards.
Figure 6 illustrates the result.  The top panel represents the determination of non-cooperative
trade and labor policies   and  .  As established previously, these policies are inefficient, as full JN s N
efficiency requires that the domestic country’s import protection be eliminated and that its labor
standard be strengthened to  .  The domestic government could simply agree to eliminate its tariff, s E
thereby securing one part of the efficient policy combination.  However, as domestic labor policy is
“off limits” to negotiation by assumption, an agreement which achieved free trade would induce the
domestic government to weaken its labor standard below   to  .  But efficiency calls for a s N s F
strengthening of domestic labor standards beyond   to  .  Hence, as the domestic government s N s E
agrees to liberalize its trade policy, it will unilaterally be adjusting its labor standard in the wrong
direction from the standpoint of world-wide efficiency and creating further distortions.  As a
consequence, it will not be efficient to negotiate a tariff agreement that calls for free trade.  Instead,19
(constrained) efficiency will call for a balance between the costs of distortions in trade policy and the
costs of distortions in labor standards. 
The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the determination of the optimal tariff agreement when
labor standards are beyond the reach of international negotiations.  The agreement calls for tariff
liberalization to achieve a tariff below the non-cooperative tariff  , but this liberalization does not JN
go all the way to free trade.  Rather, the tariff level   called for in the agreement lies strictly between JG
free trade and the non-cooperative tariff  .  At the optimal negotiated tariff  , a slight amount of JN JG
additional tariff liberalization would create additional domestic and foreign gains from trade (through
a further reduction in the dead weight loss  ) which would be just offset by the reductions in D
domestic and foreign gains from trade and the increases in domestic surplus that come with the
weaker domestic labor standards that further tariff liberalization would engender.  As indicated in the
figure, the agreed-upon tariff liberalization to   will induce the domestic government to choose JG
(unilaterally) to weaken its labor standard from   to  .  Hence, the optimal tariff agreement will s N s G
fail to eliminate tariffs as it leads to weaker labor standards, and consequently the surplus generated
by an agreement over tariffs alone can not achieve the level of surplus attainable with international
cooperation over both trade and labor policies. 
Thus we have:
Observation 2: International negotiations over tariffs alone will lead to a globally inefficient
outcome described by partial tariff liberalization and a weakening of labor
standards in import-competing industries.
Again we note that this observation reflects our focus on the interaction between labor
standards and import competition, and opposite forces will be at work with regard to the choice of
labor standards whose central effects are on export sectors.  However, this focus does give some
credence to the view that successive rounds of GATT-sponsored tariff liberalization may be fueling
a “race to the bottom” in which the labor standards of the industrialized world are being sacrificed13In practice there may also be an important “North-South” asymmetry at work that serves to diminish the
extent of interaction between tariff liberalization and the choice of labor standards in export industries, and which
thereby serves to further justify our focus on labor standards in an import-competing industry.  In particular, if we
think of the group of less-industrialized countries who export labor-intensive goods to their large industrialized
trading partners as individually being unable to have significant impacts on export prices in the world economy,
then the incentive to distort labor standards in import-competing industries as we have analyzed it above will exist
for the industrialized countries, but there will be no analogous incentive to distort labor standards in the export
sectors of the less-industrialized countries.  Hence, the labor standards issues relevant to the WTO will be those
associated with import-competing industries.
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in the name of international “competitiveness.”
13  It is from such a backdrop that proposals to
introduce the issue of labor standards onto the WTO agenda are often advanced.  In the next section
we consider a number of approaches that might be taken to handle the issue of labor standards within
the WTO.
V.  How GATT Negotiations can be Structured to Strengthen Labor Standards
In the preceding section we showed that tariffs and labor-standards will be set at inefficient
levels if they are determined non-cooperatively, and that attempts to address these problems through
international negotiations over tariffs alone will lead to globally inefficient outcomes characterized
by partial tariff liberalization and a weakening of labor standards.  In this section we consider three
approaches to negotiations that can achieve efficient outcomes.  We begin with the most obvious
approach, which is to introduce the issue of labor standards directly on to the agenda of international
trade negotiations.  
It is clear that direct negotiations over tariffs and labor standards together will allow the
domestic and foreign government to negotiate to the efficient outcome of free trade and a domestic
labor standard    (with a possible need for lump sum international payments across countries). s E
However, it is interesting to note that the addition of labor standards to the negotiating agenda will
not only result in an agreement to strengthen labor standards, but will make further tariff liberalization
desirable as well.  To see this, we refer to Figure 7, the top panel of which depicts the determination
of the optimal tariff agreement when negotiations over labor standards is not allowed.  As described21
previously, in the absence of the ability to negotiate an agreement over labor standards, it will be
efficient for the trade agreement to call for partial liberalization of the domestic import tariff toJG
with the domestic labor standard then set unilaterally by the domestic government at a level   that s G
lies below the efficient level  .  When labor standards are added to the negotiating agenda, it is then s E
possible to implement an agreement on tariffs and labor standards that achieves the efficient outcome
of free trade and a domestic labor standard set to  , as the bottom panel of Figure 7 indicates.  But s E
this implies that the addition of labor standards to the international negotiating agenda provides new
impetus for further tariff liberalization, as the reason for failing to negotiate to free trade in the first
place has been removed.  Hence, the addition of labor standards to the international negotiating
agenda will bring about negotiations which both tighten labor standards and lead to further reductions
in tariffs.
    While the introduction of direct negotiations over labor standards can address the
inefficiencies associated with negotiations over tariffs alone, this approach nevertheless requires that
governments completely relinquish their national sovereignty over labor standards, a policy issue that
has traditionally been considered a “domestic” concern.  In fact, as we have shown above, it is the
sovereign control over labor standards and the implied right to set these standards unilaterally that
causes the problem.  But are there approaches to negotiation that can achieve efficient outcomes and
yet allow governments to preserve some degree of sovereignty over the determination of their labor
standards?   As it turns out, the answer is “yes,” and in the remainder of this section we describe two
additional approaches to negotiation that will achieve efficient outcomes but that do not require direct
negotiations over labor standards.  
To understand how it is possible to provide the domestic government with some degree of
unilateral control over its labor standards and yet achieve a fully efficient outcome through direct
negotiations over tariffs alone, it is helpful to consider more closely the unilateral incentives that the
domestic government would have to distort its labor policy choice starting from the fully efficient
agreement.  The bottom panel of Figure 7, which characterizes the determination of the fully efficient
agreement, can help to reveal these incentives.  Recall that this agreement eliminates the domestic22
import tariff and sets the domestic labor standard at  , where the gain in domestic surplus created s E
by a slight reduction in   would just be offset by the associated loss in domestic and foreign gains s
from trade.  Of course, from a unilateral perspective, the domestic government will not value the
gains from trade that its labor policies create for its trading partner, and it is because of this that the
domestic government has a unilateral incentive to weaken its labor policy from  .  But this suggests s E
that if the domestic government were granted the freedom to make unilateral adjustments to its labor
policy, it would face the “right” incentives to make efficient choices provided that it was obligated
to make offsetting adjustments to its tariff which preserved the gains from trade of the foreign
country.  The gains from trade for the foreign country are determined in turn by the foreign price of
x, and so this obligation would amount to a commitment by the domestic government to make
offsetting tariff changes which preserve the foreign export price as it adjusts its labor standards.  This
basic logic underlies the final two approaches to negotiations that we now describe.
The first of these alternative negotiation approaches bears a strong resemblance to the findings
of Kemp and Wan (1976), who showed that the membership of a customs union could always be
increased in such a way as to raise the national income of member-countries without reducing the
national income of any non-member country, by adjusting the (common) external tariff of the customs
union to preserve export prices.  In the present setting, we suppose that the two governments
negotiate an agreed level of tariffs, and then that the domestic government is free to unilaterally alter
its labor standard provided that it simultaneously makes Kemp-Wan adjustments to its import tariff
which preserve the foreign export price at the level implied by the negotiated tariff (and the domestic
labor standard in place at the time of tariff negotiations).  
Figure 8 illustrates.  We suppose that the two countries have previously engaged in
negotiations over tariffs alone (with unrestricted sovereignty granted to the domestic government
over its labor standard), so that they begin from the (constrained) efficient tariff and labor policies
first characterized in Figure 6.  We then suppose that, in the current round of tariff negotiations, it
is agreed that if the domestic government subsequently loosens its labor standard from its existing
level it will then be obligated to reduce its tariff to offset the impact of its altered labor standards on23
the price received by foreign exporters.  Conversely, if the domestic government subsequently
tightens its labor standard from its existing level, then it is agreed that it will be able to raise its tariff
to offset the impact of its altered labor standards on the price received by foreign exporters.  As these
Kemp-Wan tariff adjustments eliminate the ability of the domestic government to use subsequent
alterations of its labor standards to capture a portion of the foreign country’s gains from trade under
the tariff agreement, they will ensure that the domestic government has the “right” incentives when
selecting its labor standard, given any negotiated foreign export price (and foreign gains from trade)
that it must preserve.  The only task of the current round of tariff negotiations is then to ensure that
the domestic government faces the “right” (i.e. efficient) foreign export price when making its
unilateral labor standard decisions.  
In the top panel of Figure 8, the efficient foreign export price is labeled  , and is p
E(
x
determined by the free trade equilibrium in which the domestic labor standard is set at its efficient
level  .  Since the domestic labor standard   in place at the time of (the current) tariff s E s G
negotiations is below  , efficient tariff negotiations that result in a foreign export price of   will s E p
E(
x
require the liberalization of the domestic tariff from its initial level of   to a level that is initially JG
below the efficient tariff of zero (i.e., an import subsidy).  This is depicted in the top panel of Figure
8, and notice that a new dead weight loss triangle labeled   has been created by the tariff agreement D )
given the existing domestic labor standard.  Hence, neither the tariff nor the domestic labor standard
is efficient at this point.  
Following the conclusion of the round of tariff negotiations, the domestic government will
then be free to unilaterally adjust its labor standard while making Kemp-Wan adjustments to its
import tariff.  The bottom panel of Figure 8 depicts these adjustments.  As the obligation to make
Kemp-Wan adjustments will prevent the domestic government from capturing a portion of the foreign
gains from the tariff agreement by weakening its labor standard, it will have no incentive to do so.
On the other hand, as Kemp-Wan adjustments permit the domestic government to raise its tariff as
it raises its labor standard, they allow the domestic government to capture all the additional gains
from trade created by tighter labor standards.  But this implies that the domestic government  will14Above we have outlined a two-step process that achieves efficient trade and labor policies, under which
the domestic government first reduces its tariff in the context of a tariff negotiation with the foreign government
and then subsequently raises its tariff and labor standard in a Kemp-Wan fashion.  As our discussion indicates,
domestic welfare rises throughout the second step of this process while foreign welfare remains unchanged.  To
ensure that each country gains as well in the first (negotiation) step, it will be necessary for the foreign government
to make an international lump-sum transfer to the domestic government in exchange for its tariff cut.  The
assumption that such transfers are feasible simplifies our analysis, but it is not required for our results (see Bagwell
and Staiger, 1998). 
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then choose to raise its labor standard to the efficient level   (which, it should be recalled, balanced s E
all the additional gains from trade created by tighter labor standards against the reduction in domestic
surplus)  and simultaneously raise its import tariff to free trade (from an initial import subsidy).  At
these (efficient) policy choices, the domestic government can do no better for itself, as it is committed
through Kemp-Wan adjustments to the efficient foreign export price and therefore to preserving
foreign surplus at its efficient level.
14  Hence, international negotiations over tariffs alone with Kemp-
Wan adjustments will achieve efficient trade and labor policies.
In Figure 9 we summarize the relationships derived above and depict the logic of Kemp-Wan
adjustments from a slightly different perspective.  In this figure we plot the domestic import tariff J
on the horizontal axis and the domestic labor standard   on the vertical axis.  The efficient policy s
combination of free trade and a domestic labor standard set at   is labeled as point   in the figure, s E E
and this represents the goal of international negotiations.  Also depicted running through point   is E
a “Kemp-Wan” curve (labeled  ) that reflects combinations of   and   that fix the foreign export p
E(
x J s
price at  .  The curve labeled   depicts the domestic country’s preferred  choice of labor p
E(
x s(J)
standard   for any level of import protection  , and it describes a constraint by which international s J
negotiations over tariffs alone must abide as long as the domestic government is granted unrestricted
sovereignty over its labor standard.  At every point along this curve, the domestic country’s
indifference curves (labeled  ) are vertical.  The point on this curve labeled  depicts the W G
(constrained) efficient tariff and labor policies   and  , where world surplus is maximized subject JG s G
to the constraint  given by  : this is reflected in the figure by the tangency at point   between the s(J) G
constraint   and the iso-world-surplus curve labeled  .  It is from point   that the new s(J) W%W ( G
“Kemp-Wan” round of tariff negotiations begins.  The two-step procedure to move from   to G E25
described above can now be readily seen in Figure 9.  With the labor standard   taken as given in s G
the first step, tariff negotiations reduce the import tariff   along the horizontal line through   until J G
the “Kemp-Wan” curve   is hit (at point   in the figure).  Then in the second step, the domestic p
E(
x B
country is granted limited sovereignty to make any Kemp-Wan adjustments to its policy mix that it
desires (i.e., it must remain on the curve  ).  But as Figure 9 makes clear, the Kemp-Wan p
E(
x
adjustments made by the domestic country will lead the world to the efficient point  , as the policy E
combination associated with point   provides the domestic country with the highest level of welfare E
it can achieve along the “Kemp-Wan” curve (as reflected in the tangency between    and the p
E(
x
domestic country’s indifference curve at point  ).  In this way, efficiency can be achieved without E
international negotiations over domestic labor standards.  
While we have shown that direct negotiations over labor standards are not required to achieve
efficient outcomes, it is nevertheless important to observe that the loss of domestic sovereignty
implicit in the second negotiating approach we have outlined above is substantial, especially when
compared to current norms under the GATT/WTO.  In particular, the combination of tariff
negotiations and Kemp-Wan adjustments as we have described them above require that governments
are to be held rigidly to the export prices and trade volumes implied (in light of initial labor standards)
by the outcome of their tariff negotiations.  By contrast, under current GATT practice the trade
volumes implied by a negotiated tariff agreement are not considered rigid commitments.  In particular,
GATT rules (and more specifically GATT’s Article XXVIII) reserve for member-governments the
right to unilaterally raise tariffs above previously-agreed-to levels.  When  a government exercises this
right and denies previously negotiated “market access” to its trading partners, its trading partners are
then allowed under GATT rules to take reciprocal actions which deny it an equivalent degree of
access to their markets.  As we have emphasized elsewhere (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger,
1996, 1997, forthcoming), these reciprocal actions will serve to stabilize the export-price effects of
a government’s initial decision to unilaterally raise its tariffs above previously-agreed-to levels.
Hence, under current GATT practice, governments are effectively held to the export prices implied
by their tariff negotiations.  But they are not held to the implied trade volumes.  26
Thus, while the second negotiating approach we have described above would imply that
governments must commit to both the export prices and the trade volumes that emerge from a tariff
negotiation, GATT’s existing emphasis on reciprocity implies that governments are effectively only
committing to the export prices that emerge from tariff negotiations.  We now ask whether these
more limited tariff commitments might be combined with subsequent Kemp-Wan adjustments to again
allow governments to reach efficient outcomes through tariff negotiations alone.  In particular, in a
third and final approach to negotiations we suppose that the two governments negotiate an agreed
level of tariffs, and that subsequent to tariff negotiations (i) either government is free to announce that
it plans to raise its tariff, at which point its trading partner will then be free to increase its tariff by a
reciprocal amount, and (ii) the domestic government is free to alter its labor standard provided that
it simultaneously makes Kemp-Wan adjustments to its tariff. 
To evaluate this final negotiating approach, we must introduce a second good, y, imported
by the foreign country and subject to a foreign import tariff.  As this good serves effectively only to
provide the foreign government with a means to take “reciprocal” tariff actions in response to the
actions of the domestic government, we keep this industry as simple as possible and abstract from
issues of labor standards in industry y either at home or abroad.  Instead, we assume simply that, with
denoting the domestic market price of good y, domestic demand for good y is given by  py Cy’1&py
while domestic supply is given by  .  Similarly, with    denoting the foreign market price Qy’1%py p
(
y
of good y, we assume that foreign demand and supply  of good y are given, respectively, by






















.   Ey(py)/Qy(py)&Cy(py)
Our final task before considering this third approach to negotiations is to define what is meant
by reciprocity in a tariff agreement.  Here we follow our earlier work (see, for example, Bagwell and
Staiger, 1997, forthcoming) and assume under the tariff agreement that, if subsequent to
implementing the agreement the domestic government wishes to raise its tariff so as to reduce foreign
export volume into its markets, then it will be free to do so.  However, in this event, the foreign27
government will be permitted to raise its tariff reciprocally so as to reduce by the same amount the
domestic export volume into its markets.  Of course, the foreign government enjoys a symmetric right
to initiate modification of its own tariff and can expect under the tariff agreement a reciprocal
response from the domestic government.  It can be shown that, in the present context, the implied














where the superscript “o” denotes magnitudes implied under the original tariff agreement and the
superscript “m” denotes magnitudes associated with the modified tariff agreement.  Effectively, this
restriction ensures that the export price effects of one government’s decision to raise its tariff will be
neutralized by the export price effects of the tariff increase permitted under the rule of reciprocity by
its trading partner.  In our earlier work we assumed that government policies consisted solely of
tariffs, and showed that reciprocity as described above could guide governments to efficient tariff
agreements.  In the present context government policies also include the domestic labor standard, and
we now show that, when combined with subsequent Kemp-Wan adjustments, reciprocity will guide
governments through  international negotiations over tariffs alone to achieve efficient tariff and
labor policies.
Having described the restrictions on modifications to an original tariff agreement that are
allowed under reciprocity, we may now characterize the tariff agreement that will be negotiated under
reciprocity with subsequent Kemp-Wan adjustments.  Figure 10 illustrates.  For simplicity, we
suppose as before that the two countries have previously engaged in negotiations over tariffs alone
(without reciprocity and with unrestricted sovereignty granted to the domestic government over its
labor standard).  This implies that as the current round of negotiations begins, the two governments
will begin from free trade in good y (recall that we have for simplicity assumed away any labor
standard issues in industry y), and they will begin from the  (constrained) efficient tariff and labor
policies characterized in Figure 6 for good x.  Now suppose that, as depicted in the top panel of
Figure 10,  the two governments were to negotiate the same degree of tariff liberalization in industry28
x as they would have negotiated (in the absence of reciprocity) under the Kemp-Wan adjustments of
Figure 8.  It can now be seen from the bottom panel of Figure 10 that the more-limited tariff
commitment implied by reciprocity will still allow this outcome to be sustained. 
To see this, observe that the third negotiating approach described above will permit the
domestic government to make unilateral Kemp-Wan adjustments to its tariff and labor policies in
industry x without fear of triggering a tariff response from the foreign government, as these
adjustments preserve the foreign export price   and thus do not  invite the foreign government to p
(
x
alter its tariff under reciprocity (i.e., so as to induce reciprocal changes in the domestic export price
).  As we showed previously, these adjustments will achieve the efficient policy mix in the x py
industry, with free trade then prevailing in both industries x and y and the efficient domestic labor
standard   in place, as the bottom panel of Figure 10 indicates.  Furthermore, while either country s E
would still be free under reciprocity to raise its tariff, the reciprocal tariff increase that can be imposed
by its trading partner under reciprocity as described above is sufficient to eliminate each government’s
incentive to close its own import markets.  Hence, when combined with subsequent Kemp-Wan
adjustments, reciprocity will guide governments through  international negotiations over tariffs alone
to achieve efficient tariff and labor policies.
Gathering the results of this section together, we have:
Observation 3: Any of the following three approaches to multilateral trade negotiations could
allow governments to reach a globally efficient outcome achieved by complete
tariff liberalization and a strengthening of labor standards:
(A) Introduce the issue of  labor standards directly on to the agenda of
multilateral trade negotiations and negotiate commitments over both
tariffs and labor standards; 
(B) Exclude the issue of labor standards from multilateral negotiations and
negotiate commitments over tariffs alone, but subsequent to tariff29
negotiations allow any country wishing to strengthen its labor
standards to increase its tariff levels as well, provided that its tariff
adjustments are made to neutralize the export-price effects of its
strengthened labor standards; or 
(C) Exclude the issue of labor standards from multilateral negotiations and
negotiate commitments over tariffs alone, but subsequent to tariff
negotiations (i) allow any country to raise its tariffs, provided that its
trading partners have the right to reciprocate with tariff increases of
their own which serve to stabilize export prices, and (ii) allow any
country wishing to strengthen its labor standards to increase its tariff
levels as well, provided that its tariff adjustments are made to
neutralize the export-price effects of its strengthened labor standards.
It is interesting to observe that, from the perspective of the GATT/WTO, approach (C)
effectively amounts to permitting countries to credit changes in their labor standards as a
“compensatory adjustment” when engaged in Article XXVIII tariff renegotiations.  Consequently,
our results suggest that relatively straightforward changes to the rules of GATT could allow
governments to implement efficient labor standards without the need for direct international
negotiations over these policies.  
Finally, we note that there is an important distinction between these changes to the rules of
GATT and the changes that have been proposed in recent WTO discussions, namely, the formal
inclusion of a “social clause” that would permit restrictions to be placed on imports from countries
not complying with a specified list of minimum standards.  These proposed changes would allow
governments to raise import restrictions in response to the weak labor standards of their trading
partners, possibly by expanding GATT’s Article XX (which currently permits tariffs to be raised
against the importation of the products of prison labor) or Article VI (under which countervailing
duties can be imposed against imports that are subsidized).  In contrast, the changes suggested by our
analysis would instead allow governments to raise import restrictions in exchange for tightening their30
own labor standards.  This reorientation linking the permissible level of import protection in GATT
to one’s own labor standards rather than the labor standards of one’s trading partners is a fundamental
feature of our analysis, and this feature is likely to appear in settings which are much more general
than the simple model we have used here to illustrate it.         
VI.  Conclusion
How should the issue of domestic labor standards be handled in the GATT/WTO?  This is a
question that is currently before the WTO, where member-countries are considering proposals for
a new round of negotiations that would move beyond GATT’s existing focus on trade barriers and
cover "domestic" issues such as labor and environmental standards and regulatory reform, issues that
have traditionally been treated with “benign neglect” within GATT.  
In this paper we have considered several approaches to the treatment of domestic labor
standards within a trade agreement.  We have used simple economic arguments to show that, while
the benign neglect of labor standards within a trade agreement will result in inefficient choices for
both trade barriers and labor standards, direct negotiations over labor standards are not required to
reach efficient outcomes.  Specifically, we have described two alternative tariff negotiating structures
that deliver efficient outcomes while preserving varying degrees of national sovereignty over policy
choices.  A first approach combines tariff negotiations with subsequent Kemp-Wan adjustments,
under which each government is free to alter unilaterally its policy mix so long as trade volumes are
not affected.  A second approach adds to the first approach GATT’s rule of reciprocity, under which
subsequent to tariff negotiations each government is free to alter unilaterally its tariff, but its trading
partner is then free to reciprocate with a tariff response which stabilizes export prices.   We have
shown that both approaches will deliver governments to the efficiency frontier, but that the second
approach provides governments with greater sovereignty over their policy choices and bears a strong
resemblance to the negotiating procedures spelled out in GATT.15The practicality of Kemp-Wan-type tariff adjustments in the context of customs-union formation has
been discussed by McMillan (1993) and Srinivasan (1997). 
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While in principle our results point toward a relatively simple “fix” for the contentious issue
of labor standards in the WTO, in practice there are of course a host of important caveats which must
be borne in mind.  First among these is the “slippery slope” argument that asks of the WTO, “Why
stop at labor standards?”  To some degree virtually all domestic policy choices of large economies
such as the United States will have implications for export prices in the world economy and hence
could be the subject of an analysis similar to that which we have undertaken here.  Where, then,
should  the WTO draw the line?  Also important is the question of how, given the complexities of the
real world, the trade effects of a given change in domestic labor standards could be assessed with any
accuracy.
15  These and other arguments might well be offered up against the advisability of altering
the rules of GATT in the way that our formal results suggest.  On the other hand, the direct
international negotiation of domestic labor standards and the subsequent enforcement of a WTO
“social clause” seems itself to be an extraordinarily complex task which is not immune to the “slippery
slope” argument, and at the same time this approach crosses a boundary of national sovereignty that
has served GATT well for 50 years.  Hence, if anything is to be done to address the issue of labor
standards in the WTO, the new approach that we have highlighted here seems at least worthy of
discussion along side the others.
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Figure 2: Introduction of Trade 